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Autonomy: Exploring Surveillance
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Action at Airport Security
Checkpoints
Meghan E. McNamara* and Stephen D. Reicher
School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom
This paper critiques and extends the notion of autonomy by examining how common
autonomy definitions construct selfhood, with the support of an analysis of airport
surveillance experiences. In psychology, autonomy is (1) often oriented around volition
and action rather than the-self-that-acts and (2) the-self-that-acts is construed in
singular terms. This neglects the multiple, context-variable self: while others may confirm
our self-definitions (recognition), identity claims may also be rejected (misrecognition).
The autonomy critique is sustained through an ethnographic analysis of airport security
accounts (N = 156) in multiple nations with comparable security procedure (e.g.,
identification checks, luggage screening, questioning). Such procedures position people
in multiple ways (e.g., as safe/dangerous, human/object, respectable/trash). Where
respondents felt recognized, they experienced the security procedures positively,
actively assisted in the screening process (engaged participation), and did not adapt
their behaviors. Where respondents felt misrecognized, they experienced surveillance
negatively, were alienated, and responded by either accommodating their behavior to
avoid scrutiny, seeking to disrupt the process, or else withdrawing from screening sites.
In misrecognition, the strategies that are open to the subject are incompatible with
autonomy, if autonomy is defined solely in terms of volition. Accordingly, the concept
of autonomy needs to be analyzed on two levels: in terms of the subject’s ability freely to
determine their own sense of self, as well as the actor’s ability freely to enact selfhood.
Keywords: airports, autonomy, identity claims, frame of reference, recognition/misrecognition, selfhood, social
identity, surveillance
INTRODUCTION
Surveillance is a pervasive part of the contemporary world (Lyon, 2018). It is embedded in everyday
life (Green and Zurawski, 2015), unless you go completely ‘off the grid’ (Joh, 2013). And yet, its
significance to psychological research has long been underestimated (Ellis et al., 2016), despite
the fact it has a long history (cf. Gilliom, 2001; Choudry, 2019). This is a critical deficit, given
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that surveillance has been characterized as ‘ubiquitous’
(Andrejevic, 2012), ‘intensifying’ (Ball and Webster, 2003;
Jeffreys-Jones, 2017), and takes many forms. To name but a
few, companies classify potential consumers (Pridmore and
Zwick, 2011), employers monitor productivity (Ball, 2003),
and government and non-government organizations intercept
cellular phone communication (Pell and Soghoian, 2014). In all
of these forms, and many others besides, surveillance observes
and analyzes characteristics and action.
A good illustration of this can be seen in the novel, The Circle
(Eggers, 2013), which illustrates a speculative, near-future society
filtered through a surveillance culture lens (Lyon, 2018). There
is but one possible self in The Circle, that of the enthusiastically
open and participatory Circle citizen, and it must always be
legible to the system (see also, Martin, 2010). So, Mae, a Circle
employee, becomes fully transparent. She enthusiastically records
and broadcasts her daily life. In the course of live streaming,
however, she exposes one of her parents’ intimate moments to
Internet viewers (see also, Ball, 2009).
While Mae can act autonomously within the Circle, her
parents can’t. By the end of the story, she hadn’t heard from them
in months. Despite this, she assumed “it would only be a matter
of time (Eggers, 2013, p. 497).” The impression we are left with
is, should contact be reestablished, it would not be willing on her
parents’ part. And yet, Mae remains oblivious. She assumes she
understands their selfhood and actions, but she does not.
This example demonstrates two things. First, trying to
understand action with an inadequate model of selfhood is
a risky proposition. Second, autonomy requires the ability to
act from the self one chooses. As such, it also illustrates a
fundamental assumption that exists within popular academic
autonomy definitions: that there is but one self that acts.
Self-Determination Theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985) provides
a good example. Here, “autonomy refers . . . to the feeling of
volition that can accompany any act (Ryan and Deci, 2000b,
p. 74).” The core arguments focus on motivated action, that is,
whether you do something because you want to do it (autonomy),
because of an external reward or punishment (heteronomy) (e.g.,
Ryan and Deci, 2000a), or because you decide the behavior is
meaningful (identification) (e.g., Ryan and Deci, 2012).
Autonomy is therefore intimately bound up with selfhood.
However, the nature of selfhood is underexplored in this
literature. Here, autonomy definitions are structured around
action, and assume selfhood. In order to understand autonomy,
we must also understand the self that acts.
These are the issues explored in this paper, in the context of
airport security screening:
(1) The role of selfhood in autonomy, by problematizing ‘self ’
and ‘autonomy’;
(2) The experience of others perceiving self-definitions that
are consonant (recognition) or dissonant (misrecognition)
with our own;
(3) How people respond and behave after
recognition/misrecognition;
(4) The analytical implications for autonomy under conditions
of recognition/misrecognition.
As demonstrated in the analysis, airport surveillance observes
people and then sorts them into categories. It defines them as
‘safe’ or ‘dangerous,’ as ‘one of us’ or as an ‘enemy to us.’ Both
are concerned with recognition and may lead people to feel
misrecognized. What does this mean to those under scrutiny, and
what does it tell us about autonomy?
The Relationship Between Selfhood,
Context, and Action
As intimated, the prevailing psychological autonomy
literature has under-theorized selfhood. For instance, Self-
Determination theorists define the self as “the psychological
manifestation and extension of the organizational properties
common to all living things (Ryan, 1991, p. 214).” The self
is described as the “set of coherently organized processes,
structures, and energies that are the developmental
outcome of organisimic integration (Ryan et al., 2015,
p. 801).” This opens up, but does not address, a series of
possibilities around selfhood. This paper examines just
one set of issues, which will be central to the subsequent
argument: whether selfhood is single or multiple, and the
significance of context.
First, although the research that investigates action, like
Self-Determination Theory, implies that multiple selves are
possible (e.g., Ryan and Deci, 2012), it is not made clear
how these selves are structured, or how they function, as a
part of human experience (McConnell, 2011; McConnell et al.,
2012). As a result, there is a lack of attention to contextual
variability and the consequences of interacting with social
norms and structures.
This inattention to the multiple self and social practice is
not unique. Much of the psychological literature conceives of
selfhood as singular and context-independent. A constant, ‘core’
self is assumed to remain unchanged between situations and
across time, which is not the case (cf. Onorato and Turner, 2004).
Even though the possibility of multiple selves is mentioned in
passing, “the impression derived from the literature suggests that
there is a single self (McConnell, 2011, p. 4).”
Second, the autonomy literature has not been explicit about
how selfhood relates to context, and whether it varies as
a consequence of context. Instead, context is addressed in
the delimited sense of whether it is controlling or autonomy
supportive (e.g., Ryan and Deci, 2012). However, contexts are
structured by human perception, practices, and sense-making
(Shweder, 1995). As a result, positionality (characteristics like
identities and location) affects how we see the world (Sánchez,
2010). It follows that understanding how people experience
and react to situations may well require understanding
multiple contexts.1
This, in turn has implications for understanding action.
Linking action to the self without explicitly relating selfhood to
context inevitably compromises the ability to theorize autonomy.
Conceptually integrating the context-variable self into how
autonomy is defined presents a solution.
1These contexts are myriad, including (but not limited to) ideological, social,
structural (Reicher, 2004) and intersectional contexts (e.g., Stephens et al., 2012).
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The Variable Self and Its Implications for
Action
The notion of the variable self has acquired prominence in
psychology through the social identity tradition (Tajfel and
Turner, 1979), and more recently through self categorization
theory (Turner et al., 1987), which is distinctive precisely
for the way in which it links a variable self-concept to the
changing structure of the various contexts in which we live
(Turner et al., 1994). Briefly, social identity theorists argue
that the self is not a unitary construct, but rather a system
in which we have many identities that vary as a result of
context. While some may choose to identify with, say, a
political party or a favorite sports team, not all categories are
freely chosen, and not all claimed identities are recognized
by others. This is crucially important, as misrecognition
constrains action (Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; see also,
White, 2002).
But this is not all. A variable self reading of the social world
also reveals a critical blind spot in psychology research design,
which has implications for how the previous autonomy literature
should be analytically understood. While the ways in which
we are constrained by others is acknowledged in principle in
psychology, it is often ignored in practice in a domain where
experiments are the dominant research method.
As Howarth (2002) argued in reference to social identity and
self-categorization research in particular, experiments construct
a world where “the picture is of each and every individual
constructing an identity on [their] own, choosing where
to position [themself], cut off from the influence of and
pressure from others (p. 157).” This critique is applicable
to most quantitative research on identity in psychology. In
most circumstances, researchers analyze identity in terms of
how people self-identify. Identity is treated as a choice, rather
than as a claim. Generally (though not always: see Hopkins
et al., 2015), there is no attention paid to whether these
claims are accepted by others. Even when participants are
allocated to conditions randomly, these biases still exist when
investigators talk about identity in relationship to variables
that are determined by how participants filled out their
demographics questionnaires.
Other researchers, however, have shown clearly that it is better
to regard identity as a claim rather than a choice (Joyce et al.,
2013; Joyce and Lynch, 2018; Moffitt et al., 2018). Whether the
claim is accepted or not is far from assured. As a result, the
match or mismatch between how I see myself (or wish to be seen)
and the ways others see me becomes crucial to whether action is
constrained or autonomous. Let us therefore explore it further.
Recognition and Misrecognition Are
Centrally Important to Understanding
Action
The rift between imposed and accepted self-definitions can
be understood through the concepts recognition and mis-
recognition. To be clear, the term ‘self-definition’ describes
both imposed (hetero self-definition) and self-generated (auto
self-definition) categories that are used to label parts of the
self-complex. Self-definitions are phenomenological and can
be observed directly (e.g., through self-report). Therefore,
they should not be confused with self concepts, which are
“hypothetical cognitive structure[s] which cannot be observed
directly (Turner et al., 1987),” or self aspects, which, as
a term, has been positioned to include both hypothetical
as well as phenomenological categories (see, for instance,
McConnell, 2011).
Recognition occurs when an auto self-definition is
acknowledged, reinforced, or accepted by others. Here, there
is consonance between how I see myself and how you see
me. Misrecognition occurs when these two diverge: the auto
self-definition is either denied or else given a different value or
meaning by others. It is instead a hetero self-definition, rather
than an auto self-definition.
Recognition and misrecognition have important
consequences. This can be seen clearly in work conducted
by Blackwood and colleagues, who explored how Muslims see
themselves as Scottish but are treated as ‘other’ when passing
through airports. These participants experienced their Muslim
identity as conferring respectability, but others treated it as a sign
of danger (Blackwood et al., 2013, 2015).
So, misrecognition can be a painful experience. But it’s not
simply unpleasant. It may impact negatively on relations between
the misrecognized and those who commit misrecognition,
because it can have profound effects on the ways in which people
feel able to communicate and act (Hopkins and Blackwood,
2011). If people are unable to act on their own sense of self, they
can either act upon an imposed selfhood or else to try and reassert
their original selfhood.
In either case, simply acting on their auto self-definition
is no longer an option. So, recognition is arguably essential
to autonomy (see also, Anderson and Honneth, 2005;
Renger et al., 2017).
Finally, as explained, the self is multiple and contextually
variable. As such, autonomy becomes not just a matter of
acting upon the self, but also a matter of choosing the self
upon which one acts, and having that choice recognized. The
variable, (mis)recognized self thus presents clear implications for
autonomy, in terms of both experience and perception.
Exploring the (Mis)recognized Self and
Action in the Context of Surveillance
In order to examine these issues, the domain of surveillance
is ideal. Perhaps the clearest example of this in contemporary
society is at the airport. Here, surveillance is both ubiquitous
and explicit. We are watched, scanned, processed, sorted as we
pass through passport control, customs, and airport security
checkpoints. These classify us into different categories at different
points (see also, Lyon, 2003). We are nationals or we are
foreigners as we present our passports. We are honest or
dishonest as customs personnel scrutinize us. We are safe or we
are dangerous as camera operators look for suspicious signs. At
all these points, and many others, the way we are defined by the
surveillance process, and those who enact it, may either match or
mismatch our own self-definitions.
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Pat-downs, or frisking searches, are a good example. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the organization
responsible for conducting airport screening in the United States,
said in a recent training manual, “all standard pat-down searches
must be conducted by a [Transportation Security Officer] of the
same gender. An individual’s gender is what he or she purports
himself or herself to be [emphasis added] (TSA, 2018, p. 13).”
Here, the TSA (2018) offered its trainees two gender categories
in which to understand how to conduct what they termed “same
gender screening (p. 13).” But what if your gender identity doesn’t
fit into one of those categories?
Pat-downs are just one of many possible situations where
misrecognition may occur, and gender is just one of many
possible identity dimensions along which misrecognition
is possible. Previous recognition/misrecognition research
looked at cultural identity (Ingram, 2009; Sametband
and Strong, 2018), military identity (Molendijk, 2018),
national identity content (Hopkins et al., 2015), and the
experiences of minoritized groups in multiple contexts
(Taylor, 2007; Hopkins, 2011; Hopkins and Blackwood,
2011; Habibis, 2013; Hopkins and Greenwood, 2013; Horton,
2014; Wills, 2014; Hopkins et al., 2017), including airports
(Blackwood et al., 2013, 2015).
The present study was not limited to any specific category
or any specific aspect of the airport experience. The sample
was oriented around ‘air travelers’ generally (contrast with
Blackwood et al., 2013, 2015), so as not to assume what
categories might be relevant in advance. This left open the
possibility of finding something unexpected, unbounded by a
preconceived framework.
More specifically, the analysis addresses three questions:
(1) What are the forms of recognition and misrecognition
experienced at airports?
(2) How do people experience these forms of recognition and
misrecognition?
(3) How do people respond to different forms of recognition
and misrecognition?
The analysis of these three questions leads to a fourth, which
the findings suggest, and which is drawn together explicitly in
the discussion. This relates to the central concern of this paper.
That is, what are the implications of recognition/misrecognition
for understanding autonomy?
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty-eight participants (N = 39F; N = 19M) provided airport
security checkpoint experiences. This sample was a mix of
students (N = 34) and non-students (N = 24) who reported
multiple nationalities and places of residence. They ranged in age
from 19 to 66 (median 25), and 68% (N = 40) had completed a
Bachelor’s degree.
Those who were employed reported diverse occupations;
two participants were retired, and one was an unemployed
recent graduate.
Nearly two thirds (N = 36) self-categorized as
White/Caucasian (N = 36);2 others reported Asian (N = 1),
Asian Indian (N = 1 from North India), Caucasian and American
Indian (N = 1), Chinese (N = 1), German and Cuban (N = 1),
Latin American (N = 1), Scottish and Indian (N = 1), Taiwanese
(N = 1), Vietnamese (N = 1) in this category. One person said
‘British,’ one provided ‘Scottish,’ and three did not provide
this information.
The first author did not ask participants (N = 8) to provide
race/ethnicity when she collected data in Latvia. A local research
associate explained this question would not be a pertinent
descriptor for participants who lived there. First language was
requested as a proxy, as this indicates local majority (Latvian first
language) or minority (Russian first language) group membership
(Russian, N = 8). More detail on all of these categories can be
viewed in the Supplementary Materials.
Data
This study’s unit of analysis was airport security experience
accounts (N = 156: airport security checkpoint, N = 153; airport
security avoidance, N = 2; an encounter characterized as “no
security check” when airport staff only checked passport and
boarding pass; N = 1). Of the two people who reported airport
security avoidance, one provided six accounts that occurred
before the screening process introduced body scanners. Most
(57%; N = 33) participants reported two accounts (Median N = 2;
Min N = 1; Max N = 15). Some participants, however, talked
about experiences in summary. Therefore, it would be accurate to
say that this dataset refers to N > 156 airport security experiences.
Most (83%) of these surveillance experiences took place
in Europe (N = 71) and the United States (N = 58). Most
sites checked identification and bodies, processed luggage, and
questioned travelers (N = 1 airport conducted no questioning,
body or luggage screening for an internal, scenic flight). Reported
airport security procedures were comparable across these sites
in terms of general categories (e.g., identification, body, and
luggage screening), though there were differences in terms of
specific procedure.
As one participant observed, “there are inconsistencies in
the script and choreography” between security checkpoints.
For instance, participants reported that screening authorities
emphasized different details between sites (e.g., either X-raying
laptops in sleeves, or without any cover), but kept the broad
strokes similar (e.g., those laptops were removed from carry-
on bags so that both the computer and bag could be screened
separately). More information about these data can be found in
the Supplementary Materials, including the national locations
where screening occurred.
Sampling and Data Collection Procedure
The first author pulled these surveillance accounts from
minimally structured interviews (N = 20) and structured
2Seven of these participants qualified their categorization: White – Irish American
(N = 1), White – British (N = 1), White – German (N = 1), White – Irish (N = 1),
White – Latvian (N = 1), White – Non-Hispanic (N = 1), and White – Scottish
(N = 1).
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diaries (N = 109)3 that asked travelers to report and reflect
on their airport security experiences. Diversity sampling (in
terms of participants and airport site) directed initial data
collection, in order to explore security screening with limited
preconceptions (e.g., who might have problems, or why
those problems might exist). Theoretical sampling guided
subsequent data collection, in order to explore initial themes,
flesh out and saturate analytical categories, and challenge
developing category fit.
The first author collected these data in person, via Skype,
phone, text, email, and through a departmental office drop-
box between 2010 and 2018. She collected these data in four
stages, three targeted and one opportunistic (e.g., when someone
spontaneously shared a story that filled a gap in the dataset,
the first author asked them to participate in the study). Ethics
approval for the first round of data collection was provided
by the Department of Sociology at Cambridge. The School
of Psychology and Neuroscience at St Andrews granted ethics
approval for subsequent data collection.
In both the diaries and interviews, the first author asked
participants to narrate screening encounters at airports and then
reflect on them. Where necessary, she asked follow-up questions
in order to clarify those answers. She recorded and transcribed
most interviews. In cases where recording was not possible,
she transcribed and paraphrased quotes during or immediately
after interviews, and then wrote detailed notes soon after the
interview ended.
The first sample’s interviews (N = 12; one interview included
two participants) included participants recruited after travel
(N = 13 participants; N = 39 airport security experiences; Min = 1,
Median = 2, Max = 6). Interviewees were found through word of
mouth and opportunistic meetings. The first author explained her
interest in surveillance with the term “travel security experiences,”
and let participants talk about what they found important. Each
interview was tailored to the participant’s specific context and
communicative preferences. Some participants shared what they
were interested in starting with in advance. Those who did not
provide a topic received prompts (“e.g., please tell me about your
travel security experiences”).
For the second sample, participants (N = 36) were recruited in
advance of travel. This occurred through a call for participants
issued to two British University email lists in December
2011, through conversation (December 2011; February 2012),
and through participants sharing the study others (February–
April 2012). At total of 79 people received diaries (response
rate = 45.6%). One person, a military member, had participated in
an interview in 2010, and was also asked to provide diaries during
travel in 2012 due to theoretical sampling.
This procedure resulted in N = 103 diaries (Min = 2,
Median = 2, Max = 13), and N = 5 follow-up interviews (one
interview included two participants). Most of the latter included
people whose diaries either needed clarification or included
3Two diaries were excluded from the analysis because these respondents (who
contributed to the Latvian data collection) had “never traveled using airport
service,” and provided no further information. There was no possibility of follow-
up (both opted out of all future contact), so it was therefore not possible to analyze
these data. As a result, these respondents were not counted as participants.
characteristics otherwise unique to the dataset. One participant
was not comfortable with writing but still wished to participate,
so the first author read her the diary questions, recorded her
responses, and asked follow-up questions immediately, as this
participant knew the interviewer and used shorthand like “you
know how I am” that needed explicit clarification.
Participants were asked to fill out their diaries as soon
as possible after travel. Diaries were used to balance the
retrospective interviews; at the time of data collection, there was
no way to know whether there would be analytically relevant
differences in terms of how people reflected on their security
experiences retrospectively or soon after travel. In addition,
having multiple, mixed-method samples facilitated balance: using
both diaries and interviews addressed the risk of over-sampling
memorable outlier encounters, and facilitated a search for
divergent cases.
In order to confirm the quality of the dataset, the first author
also collected a third sample (N = 12 participants; N = 14 airport
security experiences: Min = 1, Median = 1, Max = 2). This
included retrospective diaries from students at a university in
Latvia (N = 8) and retrospective interviews from an opportunistic
sample N = 4. Two of these participants took part in the 2010
interviews: one was interviewed again because she socially shared
a different type of experience, and the other was asked to reflect
back on the following statement she reported in 2010, as it was
germane to the developing analysis:
“When I feel impatient with all the procedures and waiting in
lines I try and remind myself that they are just doing their jobs
(Catherine, 56F, American).”
This framing was still entirely familiar to her in terms of how
she usually experienced airport security (and when asked again
during the paper write-up, she said, “yes, I still feel that way”).
The 7-year-gap between collecting the initial account in 2010
and the follow-up questions in 2017 presented no challenge in
terms of reflection because this framing was still relevant to her
contemporary experience.
All of the data collection conducted outside of the first two
waves was undertaken to challenge, and then ensure, thematic
and theoretical saturation (Saunders et al., 2018). The first author
stopped collecting airport security accounts when it was clear
that experiences started repeating (thematic saturation). Since
current dataset was also theoretically saturated with regard to the
specific forms of recognition/misrecognition covered within this
study, the dataset as a whole was deemed sufficiently large for
the main analysis.
Analytical Procedure
This analysis is centered on the experience and consequences of
recognition and misrecognition during surveillance at airports.
Like Pütz (2012), this study used understanding gained through
ethnographic practice in order to analyze these data. However,
unlike Pütz (2012), the first author targeted her observation to
pre-planned travel (e.g., experiencing security as an analyst and
traveler simultaneously on some occasions, and on others simply
participating in the screening, with minimal targeted observation,
and reflecting back later), rather than arranging for access to
observe checkpoints purely as a researcher. Moreover, in contrast
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to Pütz (2012), this paper’s data are not limited to the authors’
own observation and reflection.
The airport security accounts (N = 156) were analyzed
in two stages. The preliminary adaptive thematic analysis
procedure (Table 1) was general and open. It was done in
order to better understand airport surveillance experience as
a whole, and then to discern concepts for future study. The
main analysis was focused around one of those findings,
recognition/misrecognition, which was explored with a
procedure where airport security was treated as a text alongside
the surveillance experiences (Table 2). More information on
the analytical method, including explanation of communicative
choices made during the analysis write-up, can be found in the
Supplementary Materials (see also, Levitt et al., 2017, p. 5).
Analytical Quality
Qualitative analysis validation is a contentious topic (see for
instance, Hammersley, 2008). Our approach is that the research
method, including the validity checks, should fit the needs of
the research question, data, and study context. In this case, both
authors are study population members (e.g., air travelers), and the
project was initially very open. Therefore two colleagues audited
a portion of these data (Elliot et al., 1999). One analyzed three
of the initial interviews (N = 12), and another analyzed 10 of the
initial diaries (N = 101) and all the thematic codes for those data.
The interviews and diaries were all randomly selected, except
in the case of the 2010 interviews, wherein one was specifically
included due to the second coder’s expertise in disability studies.4
In most cases, everyone independently agreed; where analyses
diverged, we then converged on a common analysis through
critical discussion.
4That interview included an account of undergoing screening in a wheelchair.
During the main analysis, the first author kept an eye
toward divergent cases (e.g., checking for data that did not fit
the developing analytical framework) and cultivated theoretical
sensitivity, meaning she immersed herself in the topic and
questioned her assumptions. For example, she interviewed a
former airport dispatcher, examined media (e.g., news, film,
literature) that referenced airport screening, observed airport
checkpoints during travel, researched airport security laws,
procedure, and technology, and explored other forms of
surveillance (e.g., biometrics, data mining, and social network
analysis) and other surveillance experiences shared by people
who knew she was a surveillance-interested researcher (e.g.,
activist observations about riot police; experiences at national
borders; the visa application process). She also discussed
the developing analysis with the second author, accessible
participants, and other interested parties (e.g., colleagues,
conference audiences, friends, talkative strangers on airplanes)
in order to challenge findings in terms of both theory and
experience. In this way, the analysis should be read as
deliberately collaborative.
Finally, both authors experienced airport security as travelers,
observed it analytically as researchers, and at turns, experienced
it from both perspectives at once. We aimed to make the impact
of our status as air travelers an analytical strength. With regard to
our positionality, that is, the way in which our own characteristics
might impact the analysis, all we knew for sure in advance was
the fact that our membership in the population of air travelers
could either be a strength (e.g., opportunity for observation), or a
weakness (e.g., risk of being blinded by assumptions). Therefore,
the first author recorded and reflected on her own airport security
experiences for 1 year (N = 8). She used those observations, and
the observations of others (including the second author), to field-
test the emerging analysis.
TABLE 1 | Adaptive thematic analysis procedure.
Step number Analytical stage Level of rigidity Source
1 Standardize units of coding Fluid Boyatzis, 1998
2 Familiarization Fluid Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clarke, 2006
3 Open coding Pattern recognition: “The ability to see” Fluid Braun and Clarke, 2006; Charmaz, 2006
4 Emic coding of experience type Fluid e.g., Maxwell, 2013; Harris, 1968
5 Connection mapping Fluid Developed in situ
6 Auditing of open and emic coding Set Influenced by Boyatzis, 1998; Elliot et al., 1999
7 Search for themes across dataset Fluid Braun and Clarke, 2006
8 Assign extracts to themes Fluid Braun and Clarke, 2006
9 Review themes Fluid Braun and Clarke, 2006
10 Define and name themes Fluid Braun and Clarke, 2006
11 Auditing of thematic material Set Influenced by Boyatzis, 1998; Elliot et al., 1999
12 Formally apply themes to research question Set Developed in situ
13 Thematic literature review Fluid Influenced by Charmaz, 2006
14 Thematic refinement Fluid Developed in situ
15 Write up findings Fluid Braun and Clarke, 2006; Charmaz, 2006
This table illustrates the study’s adaptive thematic analytical procedure. The first author designed it in order to fit the research question and the shape of the data
that resulted from the data collection process. The procedure was derived from two approaches to thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clarke, 2006) and is
influenced by Grounded Theory (e.g., Charmaz, 2006), anthropological analysis (emic and etic distinctions; Harris, 1968), guidelines for evaluating qualitative research
(Elliot et al., 1999), and innovations as necessary (steps 5, 12, and 14). The ‘level of rigidity’ refers to the degree to which interaction can occur between steps: ‘fluid’
indicates give and take between adjacent steps, and ‘set’ indicates a fixed point.
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TABLE 2 | Ethnographic practice and analysis procedure.
Step number Analytical stage Example
Ongoing throughout project Explore situation and context Approach site as a situated social practice
Investigate systems (e.g., procedure) Observed airport checkpoints during personal travel
Examine structure (e.g., technology) Analyzed body scanners from a design perspective
Situate site in the social world (e.g., current events, social
discourse)
Read (and consume other media) widely and reflected
Challenge developing analysis (e.g., member checks) Asked participants whether the analysis lines up with how they
understand their own experience
1 Theory-based coding Coded for recognition/misrecognition experiences
2 Explore recognition/misrecognition extracts
Code self-definition categories e.g., Not a bad person; e.g., Uniformed government employee
Code for how (mis)recognition is experienced e.g., “Best transit ever” (recognition) e.g., “The worst
experience” (misrecognition)
Code for actions e.g., Reproduction (recognition) e.g., Accommodation
(misrecognition)
3 Analyze recognition/misrecognition extracts for context
Refer back to interviews/diaries Situate extracts within participant’s other data
Re-contact participants with follow-up questions Situate extracts within new data
Refer back to airport security context analysis Did this experience take place before or after body scanners
were introduced?
4 Develop analytical structure Create initial analytical outline in which to write the analysis
5 Challenge analytical structure
Look for divergent cases Look for conformity/non-conformity Search for exceptions
Validate analysis by inviting critique First and second author critically challenge analysis in
conversation
6 Confirm analytical structure Formalize the analytical outline
7 Write analysis Communicate the analysis analytically and esthetically
This table illustrates the ethnographic practice and analytical procedure designed by the first author. It was fluid and should not be read as a rigid list of isolated steps. The
analysis involved exploring airport security as a social practice (the system, the structure, the situation). It also included theory-based coding for recognition/misrecognition
experiences, an exploration of the recognition/misrecognition extracts (coded for self-definitions, coded for how recognition/misrecognition is experienced, coded for
actions) and a contextual analysis (referring back to other data where, re-contacting participants where needed, and referring back to the airport security context analysis).
Following that, the analytical structure was developed and challenged. Finally, the analytical structure was confirmed and the analysis was written, with attention paid to
both analytical and aesthetic concerns.
ANALYSIS
This analysis is divided into two parts. The first deals
with recognition experiences, and the second deals with
misrecognition experiences. In each part, the following questions
are addressed:
(1) The different forms the concept takes;
(2) The ways recognition/misrecognition are experienced;
(3) The forms of action that occurred after these experiences.
Recognition
Forms of Recognition
Participants described two distinct forms of recognition. In
one, the traveler expressed a sense of being recognized in
the screening process and mentioned that screeners openly
communicated recognition (explicit recognition). In the other,
the traveler expressed a sense of being recognized in the
screening process, without indicating that screeners explicitly
communicated recognition (implicit recognition).
Explicit recognition
In explicit recognition, the screener sees travelers as they
see themselves, and communicates this. Here are two
manifestations: mutual acceptance of a shared social
identity and mutual inclusion within a shared, common
ingroup. A clear example of both concerns military personnel
traveling in uniform.
George (60M American) traveled through Cleveland Hopkins
Airport (United States) in 2012. He reported a “very short wait
to get to screeners – Went through the “First Class”/“Frequent
Flyer” line as I was traveling in US Army military uniform.
Gatekeeper TSA agent was warm and friendly and engaged me
in brief conversation as she checked my military ID. . . .The
agents did open my backpack after it passed through the X
ray [sic] machine but notified me before doing so and were
apologetic afterward. As I was waiting for the backpack to
be cleared one of the TSA Agents approached me, thanked
me for my service, and gave me a small gift pack of candy
and crackers (photo attached).” The gift label said: “Together
Securing America” and “Thank You From: OFFICERS of
Cleveland Hopkins Airport,” and included the coat of arms of the
United States (Figure 1).
George’s account and the snack gift show these TSA employees
include themselves and military members together in a single
group. These airport screeners construct the boundaries around
the ‘group of people who secure America’ such that they include
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FIGURE 1 | Gift given to George by TSA personnel. This is a photo of the
snack gift George received from screeners. He photographed it himself, and
shared it unprompted, along with his airport security diaries. It says (left)
“Together Securing America” and (right) “Thank You From: OFFICERS of
Cleveland Hopkins Airport.” The center image is the United States’ coat
of arms.
US military members (given that the label’s center image is
the United States’ coat of arms), the Transportation Security
Officers of Cleveland Hopkins Airport specifically, and the TSA
as a whole (per the boldface text on the image’s left-hand side).
What is more, they underscore their security-focused ingroup
through their emphasis of the word ‘officers,’ which is an example
of personnel terminology that is common both to the US
military and the TSA.
However, shared group membership claims, once issued, may
be accepted or rejected. In this case, George reciprocates, and also
groups himself and screeners together; specifically, as ‘uniformed
government employees.’ This is congruent with the screeners’
own ingroup category: these transportation security officers, and
the military members who accept their shared group claim,
are Together Securing America. Both the screeners and George
structure their occupational self-understanding around keeping
the surveillance-protected ingroup safe. The specific threat was
not made explicit because it is understood, or expected to be
understood, through shared sociocultural knowledge (see also,
Jovchelovitch, 2007).
Implicit recognition
While explicit recognition is characterized by reciprocity, implicit
recognition involves projection. At airport security, travelers
who experience implicit recognition consider their own self-
definitions consonant with the categories used within the
screening process. This is well-expressed by Catherine (56F,
American), who said that whenever she feels inconvenienced, or
has to wait in line, she reminds herself that the screeners are just
doing their job. She said this “helps me relate to them better. I
think most people have had to do things they didn’t necessarily
want to do, or enjoy doing, because of a job. I also realize that
what they’re doing is considered necessary and designed to keep
people, including those inconvenienced, safe.”
Here, Catherine uses two types of sense-making that are
germane to implicit recognition. First, she indicates screeners
are included within the group of ‘most people’ who have had
to do work they do not enjoy. This is a group to which she
herself feels she belongs, and that, in her thinking, includes
most people. Second, screeners are a part of the security
apparatus, and Catherine considers their work necessary. It
has a purpose, and that purpose is safety. The implied threat,
while undefined, exists somewhere outside of the ingroup.
Catherine implicitly includes herself amongst the people kept safe
by surveillance.
Irina (26F, Latvian) does as well. She transited through an
airport checkpoint in England while on a business trip. “I feel
myself normal about it,” she said: “Because this is them work
and this doings for our security.” The common, safe ‘us’ is not
nationally bounded here, as it was for the screeners George
encountered while in his US Army uniform. However, Irina does
speak more specifically of the threatening outgroup. Irina agrees
that the British airport security officers “have to check people
that possibilities for the terrorism become less.” She makes the
threat clear, but still does not define who is included the outgoup,
beyond implied terrorists. Implicit recognition as a part of a
common ingroup is an affirmation that one is not a dangerous
other, whomever they might be.
The account of Minh Tinh (66M, American), a Buddhist
monk, demonstrates this evocatively. He also sees himself as part
of the ‘common us’ along with the screeners, but he acknowledges
that this may not be immediately apparent to security personnel.
As Minh Tinh said, “I do dress unusually. I wear a long, brown
robe over a shorter robe,” he said, “and my head is shaved, and
yeah, I’m over six foot, and I’m a big man. So, physically, I can see
how people would be apprehensive. And certainly I fit outside the
mold. . . . So, prior to the TSA pre-check, I was always searched
every time, my genitals felt and squeezed, and I had my butt felt
and squeezed, and I was not particularly happy to have those
intimate body parts touched in security.”
But nevertheless Minh Tinh endorses this as part of realizing
recognition, and he retains a highly positive view of the screeners
as doing a difficult job to protect the common ingroup. “At the
same time,” he said, “if it keeps us safer, I would certainly be
willing to walk through the thing butt naked. I have no great
modesty. But I just thought it was– My genitals are sort of private,
and I prefer strangers not fondle them . . . .[But] if it does keep us
safe, I’m not unwilling to go through that again.”
The crucial term here is the ‘us’ in the last sentence. What
Minh Tinh endures as an individual, he does for the benefit of
others as a group member. This affirmative group relationship is
reflected in his positive view of the screeners: “they,” he said, “the
TSA, most of the staff, I believe, actually want to be friendly and
kind, and people generally have been very nice and very pleasant
to me. I’ve never seen anyone with an attitude. Even the few times
where I’ve been touched very intimately, the person was like, ‘I’m
sorry about that. We just have to make sure everything is safe.”’
The key element in implicit recognition is that the traveler
feels screening is designed for people like them. In so far as
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there are others who want to attack ‘us’ and it is not clear who
‘they’ are, then everyone must be treated as suspicious in order
to differentiate between the two. Implicit recognition is bound up
with seeing the screening as a necessary part of incorporation to
establish the traveler’s identity as ‘one of us.’ Here, it is a form
of recognition in which travelers establish ingroup status with
screeners, surveillance, and society as they exist together.
Experiences of Recognition
Explicit recognition
When asked how he felt about his military service-member
recognition screening experience, George said, “Very Good. [sic]
Best transit ever. Officers were warm and engaging. Part of this
was my traveling in uniform, but I have traveled in uniform
before when TSA was cold and unpleasant. . . . [This time], I felt
appreciated, connected and had a good feeling ‘high.”’
This was not just a matter of having been given a gift (refer
to Figure 1). “Remember,” George said, “the gift came at the
end . . . . they were positive and engaging from the point of entry
in the line, when my ticket was checked, before reaching the
conveyor to the scanner. The gift at the end was like the crescendo
of a good experience.”5
The gift, George said, “was an unexpected, unsolicited and
free expression of goodwill on the part of the TSA staff. Unlike
some gifts (for example to politicians, where there is an implied
expectation of reciprocity at some point in the future) there
could not be any explanation other than goodwill. That made
it especially meaningful. The cynic might say that it was merely
part of a bureaucratic scheme to curry favor with the public (I
have know [sic] way to know the origin of the gift), but the way
that it was delivered: personally, with eye contact and obvious
emotional connection made the expression very meaningful, and
memorable, for me.” The gift itself was symbolic, and made
significant through George’s sense of connection with the security
screeners in that moment.
George said that his positive experience was due to the
recognition of his identity as a government employee and his
common identity with the security personnel. Indeed, George
actually uses the term recognition to explain the positivity of
his experience. He said it had “to do with a recognition on
the part of the TSA personnel, that they are, you know, kind
of, uniformed government employees, and I’m a uniformed
government employee.” And, as it is clear from what is written
on the gift in the photograph (refer to Figure 1), this social
identity indicates inclusion within a common, in this case
national, ingroup.
Implicit recognition
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Minh Tinh’s account is
the way in which he reacts to what, in another context, would
be sexual assault. While he doesn’t express positive sentiments,
neither does he express a strongly negative sentiment. Rather, his
account is sardonic and mild: “my genitals are sort of private, and
I prefer strangers not fondle them” [emphasis added]. What is
more, in overall terms, despite their intrusions, Minh Tinh retains
5This quote was reported exactly as written: the participant used this ellipsis to
indicate a pause.
a positive view of the screening staff. “We’re all human beings on
the same journey,” he said, “and in this process, it’s so easy to look
at everyone as our brother and sister.”
Minh Tinh considers screeners to be ingroup members;
therefore they are less ‘other.’ As a result, their presence
and intimacy become less intrusive. Where screeners are not
construed in this way, even mild intrusions are experienced much
more negatively. Take Maria (30F, Greek/British), for instance,
who positions the security staff as strangers. She recounts how
having her bag searched made her feel “generally uneasy, despite
the fact that I had nothing to hide and nothing illegal. Probably
uncomfortable due to a sense that my privacy was being invaded
by strangers peering into my bags.”
While some, like Maria, found airport surveillance
uncomfortable, this scrutiny is a necessary precursor to
implicit recognition. However onerous it might seem, it confirms
ingroup membership. It follows from this that a lack of scrutiny
might be more problematic than scrutiny. Without scrutiny,
would it be difficult to discriminate ‘safe’ ingroup members from
‘dangerous’ outgroup members?
This is precisely what the findings show. Christiane (38F,
German) complains about security staff who “didn’t seem
particularly interested in the x-ray [sic] screen or the scanner or
the passengers for that matter (their mobile phones seemed to
require all their attention).” Anne (55F, British) concurs. She feels
“that if they are going to search you they should do it in detail.”
Trivial scrutiny that does not evoke recognition can be resented
more than extreme scrutiny that does induce recognition.
All in all, recognition in both forms had a positive
impact on experience. Explicit recognition created a highly
positive experience of screening. Implicit recognition
attenuated the negativity of scrutiny that might be invasive
in other circumstances.
Reactions to Recognition
At one level, it is arguable that recognition, either explicit
or implicit, invoked no particular reaction. Neither Minh
Tinh nor George, both of whom the analysis followed in
some detail, did anything different after recognition. They did
not report any changes to their actions after experiencing
recognition. But the argument that recognition creates no
reaction misses the point: while consequences normally mean
change in psychology, reproduction is a meaningful response to
a social encounter.
The fact that these travelers would continue to go through
security without changing their behavior in any particular way
is significant given that, at least in the case of Minh Tinh, the
way he was treated might, in other circumstances, lead one to
expect some change. Remember, security screeners repeatedly
touched intimate parts of his body. Minh Tinh didn’t like that,
and wouldn’t accept this treatment from a stranger on the street.
On the street, this would be an assault. At the airport, it was
experienced in terms of ‘our’ safety. It was for the ‘common us,’
which made it bearable.
So, there is more to recognition than unchanged behavior.
Both respondents not only indicated a willingness to go through
airport security again, they would willingly do more. George
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in particular emphasized this point. “I did not feel like I was
an anonymous frammet on an assembly line being processed:
powerless, preyed upon. I felt more like a willing participant for
the common good. . . .The attitude of the entire team made me
happy to willfully engage. If they had wanted to turn my socks
inside out, I would have been ok.”
The key point here is that George did not experience that
security encounter as coercive or imposed. His actions were not
mere compliance to an other’s will. They were an expression of
what he wanted to do. If anything, after recognition, he was
willing to accept more scrutiny. Like with Minh Tinh’s experience,
context is critical. George accepts scrutiny at the airport for a
common ingroup’s safety. While strangers invaded Maria’s bags,
ingroup members opened George’s backpack. Scrutiny for the
ingroup is, in George’s words, “ok.” Like Minh Tinh, he willfully
engaged for the common good.
But this is not all. Implicit recognition not only reincorporated
travelers into a ‘safe’ ingroup, it facilitated category transition.
Having experienced screening as a positive affirmation rather
than an imposition, George was motivated to act in similarly
supportive ways toward others.
“The encounter,” he said, “‘made my day,’ and I felt like
passing it on to someone else, in some way ‘paying it forward’
to another traveler. Frankly, the gift was a token that had little
monetary value, but put me in a very good place for the rest
of the day. I am sure that it positively affected the way that
I interacted with other people for at least that time period.”
Recognition not only encouraged travelers to keep doing the same
thing, it also motivated participation and inspired a desire to
incorporate others.
However, while recognition is associated with behavioral
reproduction, engaged participation, reincorporation, and
category transition, these are not given outcomes. First, one
instance of recognition, even if profound, does not result in
enduring participation. This is made clear when by returning
to George’s observation that generally speaking, whether he
travels in or out of uniform, he is “glad to get through without
being hassled.” In fact, he usually tries to avoid unnecessarily
engaging with screeners as a result of negative encounters,
which is discussed with more depth in the Reactions to
Misrecognition section.
Second, tensions arise when the recognized self-definition
conflicts with an incongruent self-definition. Apple (26M,
American) said, “I really think that the guards that are more alert,
or more strict-faced, are simply doing their jobs. And, I accept
that, as part of the national security. . . .Though, hopefully we will
live in a world that won’t be so, you know, so rigid and cautious.”
Apple includes himself within a ‘common us’ like George,
Catherine, Minh Tinh, and Irina. They all incorporate themselves
into a surveillance-safe ingroup, and accept airport security on
those grounds. As Apple’s account demonstrates, people have
multiple self-definitions, some of which may come into conflict
as they move through different contexts. Travelers can feel they
are part of a surveillance-protected ingroup and experience that
inclusion positively, but also reflect on that group membership
from the position of a self-definition that has a bittersweet, not
enthusiastic, acceptance of that ingroup status.
Misrecognition
Misrecognition, like recognition, takes numerous forms.
The analysis covers two types. The first, misrecognition by
commission, occurs when one is defined as X by others or social
practice, but X is contrary to self-definitions. This is illustrated
by example with a specific subtype, threat misrecognition, which
happens when people are positioned as dangerous even though
they feel they are a part of a safe, ‘common us.’
The second form, misrecognition by omission, transpires
when one is rejected as X, but X is consonant with self-
definitions. This involves a sense that the screening process denies
a self-definition, or denies its value. The examples demonstrate
degraded national/racial categories and dehumanization. As with
the recognition section, the analysis demonstrates different forms
of misrecognition, shows how they are experienced, and finishes
by discussing how people reacted.
Forms of Misrecognition
Misrecognition by commission
Sarah (60F, American) traveled to Texas to attend baseball games
with her daughter in early June 2002, soon after “they first
started with the heightened security stuff.” It was her first time
flying since 9/11. Screeners searched their luggage each time they
crossed a checkpoint. “It was just a pain in the behind,” she said,
“because we had to stop and open our big suitcases every time.”
When asked to explain how she felt Sarah said, “nervous, I
guess, would be a good way to describe it. Just wondering, you
know, what’s going on. You know, ‘don’t look through my bags.
I didn’t do anything.”’ Here, Sarah felt repeatedly categorized
as a threat, when she categorizes herself as a non-threat. This
was especially poignant because it was new experience for her.
Being singled out felt personal. “Especially in the beginning of
this, you felt more threatened personally, like they were singling
you out as a bad person, that they needed to double check
on.” Threat misrecognition personalizes surveillance. It makes it
about scrutinizing you, rather than about protecting the ingroup.
One way of thinking about threat misrecognition is that
it is akin to implicit recognition, without confidence in the
reincorporation process. The focus is on the moment of mistrust
and scrutiny, without the belief that it will eventually lead
to one being correctly accepted as a safe and respectable
ingroup member. To travelers who experience misrecognition by
commission, it may seem that the screening process is unable
to properly determine who is genuinely ingroup and who is
not. Lorna’s (55F, British) account demonstrates this finding.
She is a frequent business traveler, and prepares for screening
to avoid problems.
“I am very willing to take off most of my outer clothes,” she
said, “empty my bags and help the process along. I make time for
all this when I am at an airport and I have learned what to do
and try to dress appropriately so that the search and strip off is
not too much of a hassle for me. Eg [sic] wear slip-on shoes, no
belts, and carry no liquids.” In general, then, screening does not
particularly bother Lorna. She accepts it as a way of protecting
safety, even though she dislikes some aspects. “I do not like being
frisked,” she said, “as it is a very close and personal search (busoms
[sic], hand down back of trousers, and crotch). Although I believe
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2258
fpsyg-10-02258 October 18, 2019 Time: 19:3 # 11
McNamara and Reicher The Context-Variable Self and Autonomy
it important to be safe.” Most of her security experiences are,
in her words, “pretty easy going, as I am so used to all of the
security checks.”
On one occasion screeners delayed Lorna for about 5 minutes.
“No real time lost,” she said. What did annoy her about this
particular incident (“very much,” in her own words) was that in
her eyes, it demonstrated inadequate procedure. It involved “a
woman behind me dressed in full muslim [sic] dress/clothing and
head gear.” The screeners conducted a body search on Lorna, but,
she said, ignored the other woman.
“In my book,” Lorna said, “she would have been the very
person I would have searched if I had been security. The volumes
of clothing and masked face appeared to make a mockery of
all the security and searches we have to endure! Maybe she was
searched in another room, but I didn’t see it. I asked myself why
didn’t the security team conduct a similar search on her? I was
not impressed at all! Now that makes me nervous . . .Muslims not
undergoing the same checks as everyone else.”6
Because screeners don’t scrutinize someone she views as
suspect, Lorna concludes that the security process cannot
efficiently sort people into ‘safe ingroup’ or ‘dangerous outgroup’
categories. Thus, screening has no reintegrative function. It
becomes useless intrusion.
What is more, once Lorna feels people are scrutinized
inconsistently, the choice of who to scrutinize is experienced as
personal. It is a judgment of who is, and who is not, suspect.
She thereby experiences it as misrecognition in both an absolute
sense (why treat me as dangerous) and, even more acutely, in
relative terms (why treat me as more dangerous than someone
who [in her perspective] has far more reason to be placed in that
category). Being treated as dangerous is not a necessary precursor
for being recognized as safe. Instead, being treated as dangerous
can misrecognize selfhood.
Misrecognition by omission
Vik (26M, Indian) is a graduate student studying in the
United States. He catches at least two flights or more from his
home base in India to his Midwestern university. “The worst
experience I had was in London,” he said, referring to the time he
transferred between flights soon after the liquid explosives plot
that occurred in August 2006 (Chertoff et al., 2006). The airport
strictly regulated all carry-on luggage at that time.
“Thing was,” he said, “at the Indian airport, we were not told
those things would happen at the British airport. So, when we
went to the London airport, they actually took . . . everybody’s
cabin [luggage], and told it has to go to check-in. They gave
everyone a small, thin bag; just put in your passport and
documents, nothing else. I mean, you have some 300, 400 people,
you give them something like that, the possibilities of losing stuff
is pretty much high.”
“Luckily,” he continued, “at that time, I carried a very thin
bag, I mean, from India itself . . . .I did read in the papers, so
I had some idea. So, I didn’t have that much issue [with my
own luggage].” Instead, Vik’s problem was with how the London
airport security personnel treated him and his fellow Indian
6This quote was reported exactly as written: the participant used this ellipsis to
indicate a pause.
nationals. “They literally treated us like some– In a very bad way.
I mean, not as like, I don’t know what to say, the word, I don’t
want to use a bad word, but I just felt that we were very treated
like trash.”
Vik also observed differences in how the airport treated Indian
and European travelers. “Personally,” he said, “I didn’t feel like
they really treated everyone– I don’t know, I mean, that’s, to me,
it was kind of racist. In the [British] airport you also have the
Europeans also. They were not treated the way the Indians were
treated. That was something I was not happy with . . . .It was so
blatant. I mean, you can never miss it; it was like that kind of a
case. The way they were actually treating . . . .I mean, in US also
we came [later that day], but yet nothing happened. Yet, also, they
did check-up, but not to that extent. I mean, at least they treated
us with some dignity. Which is important.”
Vik’s account has been explored in some detail because it
contains two intermixed misrecognition by omission categories:
that of his humanity and that of his nationality, which he
communicated in intersectional terms with race. First, Vik objects
to being treated as trash, as a worthless object. His humanity
is ignored. He is not treated as a person with feelings and
rights. He is thoroughly dehumanized. What is more, that
dehumanization is selective. Vik is selectively treated badly as an
Indian. Europeans are not treated in the same way. Vik’s national
group membership as an Indian is defined negatively, and is
positioned as a warrant that he (and his fellow Indians) do not
deserve respectful treatment.
These two categories need not always be intermixed. Often
people resent their humanity being ignored without ascribing their
treatment to an inappropriate view of their group membership.
For instance both Nora (25F, American) and Emily (24F,
American) express concern at the ways in which they are treated
as objects, open to the gaze of others with no human rights to
privacy or dignity. Nora is concerned with body scanners. Who
sees the scans? “Nobody I have authorized to see my body, not like
in medicine where I can establish a relationship of trust.” Emily
shares this concern, although she finds being patted down even
worse: “I don’t like someone looking at me basically on display,”
she said, “but I almost prefer it to having a stranger’s hands on me
(for pat downs). Anyone can look at me and imagine me without
clothes on and see my figure, but not everyone gets to touch (you
know what I mean – the latter just feels more invasive).”
Experiences of Misrecognition
Both misrecognition by commission and omission resulted in
strong negative emotions. In the case of threat misrecognition,
a form of misrecognition by commission, travelers typically
reported mixed and unsettled emotions. When Ellie (24F,
American) visited England in 2008, a screener asked to
look at her laptop.
“And, I got very nervous,” she said, “and very kind of, I didn’t
know what was going on, and I obviously said yes, because if I
said no, then they’d probably take me away, and it would be very
bad. . . .When someone asks you that, you kind of go through
your mind, ‘Well, did I touch something, did I do something,’
and it kind of goes through that thought process of ‘I hope I
don’t get in trouble, I hope I didn’t touch something that I’ll
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2258
fpsyg-10-02258 October 18, 2019 Time: 19:3 # 12
McNamara and Reicher The Context-Variable Self and Autonomy
get in trouble,’ that kind of thing. Not that I thought I did, but
that thought process kind of goes through your head whenever
someone grabs your stuff and says ‘Is that yours?’ And you’re like,
‘uh, yes? Maybe?”’
In the case of misrecognition by omission, there is similar
negativity but less uncertainty. Nora rejected an international trip
soon after airport security introduced body scanners. As a result,
she said, “I have had to reflect, and articulate for myself why I had
that reaction [to the body scanners]. If anything, it has made me
more confident in what I am . . . .How the security is conducted
does not respect who I am.”
Misrecognition by omission also invokes anger. Fiona (24F,
British) described her experience at a Scottish airport: “As I
passed through the detector, it bleeped and a woman who was
talking to a colleague pulled me aside. She proceeded to rub down
my arms, stomach, and legs while still talking to a colleague . . . .I
think what annoyed me most of the whole experience was that
the woman who searched me continued to talk whilst searching
me. I found this very unprofessional and I felt as though I was
in a ‘cattle market’ – just someone else to process, more hassle
for them.”
Reactions to Misrecognition
Avoidance
The first way travelers react to misrecognition is simply to
avoid the sites where it occurs. Sometimes this is a matter of
avoiding particular airports where one has been misrecognized,
or thinks misrecognition is likely. Recall how Vik experienced
dehumanizing treatment in a London airport, linked to anti-
Indian discrimination. He now tries to avoid that layover
location: “Unless I go to London, I try not to connect to London.”
Some avoid aspects of the process itself. Nora, as demonstrated
previously, objects to body scanners that remove her dignity
and lay her open to the gaze of all. “It is not for strangers
to see my body,” she said. “When I fly, I have always opted
out of the scanner . . . . Usually I am traveling with an infant
in arms, so I’ve gone through the metal detector.” However,
without an infant to divert her to the metal detector, the only
other option is a thorough pat-down. Nora is equally unwilling
to be frisked, and she explained why. ‘Traveling with children,
it’s difficult for children psychologically to see police/authorities
scrutinizing parents.’7 Each time she books a flight, it’s very
stressful wondering whether she’ll be able to go through the metal
detector or not.
Sometimes, where the misrecognition experience is linked less
to a specific site or procedure, and more to generic aspects of
the screening process, the reaction is to stop flying altogether.
Charlotte (23F, British) expressed a fear of screening because she
always anticipates that some valued part of her self will be denied
or rejected. She no longer travels by air, even though this comes
at a cost. As she observed, ‘I think I’m just punishing myself by
avoiding, probably. But I feel like I’m resisting.’8 Charlotte refuses
to be miscategorized by airport security, and as a result, is unable
to travel by air.
7Quote from notes taken during an unrecorded interview.
8Quote from notes taken immediately after an unrecorded interview.
Accommodation
A second way in which people respond to misrecognition
experiences is to change their behavior to adapt to the operation
of the security system, and thereby make themselves less likely
to be picked out and exposed to special scrutiny. Remember
how Sarah, who traveled with her daughter to attend baseball
games, experienced threat misrecognition as she was repeatedly
stopped and searched at security checkpoints. Eventually, she
discovered the problem.
“I had brought newspapers to keep the box scores for the
ballgames we went to,” she said. “And I wanted to bring that stuff
home with me. So I stuck the newspapers . . . in the front pockets.
And when they lay the suitcase on its back, and shine the X-ray
through it, they can’t get through the newspapers. So they opened
it up.” So Sarah adapted her behavior. “From that point on, I have
always put any kind of papers on the bottom of the bag. I made
sure . . . . And, I’ve never had a problem.”
George, whose recognition experience was discussed with
some depth earlier, also experienced problems with a luggage
search. However, while being positioned as a threat preceded
Sarah’s misrecognition, George’s misrecognition was due to a lack
of respect. “I’ve gone through security, and for whatever reason,
they want to visually open and inspect the bag,” he said. “I asked
what the issue was. They did not tell me. I suspected it may be
a camera, a camera lens, because that can be very dense, and
perhaps confusing on the X-ray, on the radiographic screening
that they do. So, I offered to show them exactly where the camera
was, so that they wouldn’t have to root through my bag. Save them
time, and save me intrusion. And, they were very curt, to the point
of being unpleasant, and told me that I was to back away and not
touch any of the bags, and basically be quiet. And, I said, ‘you
know, I was just trying to help.’ And, I was not impressed with
their level of professionalism or appropriateness.”
So George, like Sarah, adapted his behavior. He carefully
arranges his bags to avoid attracting attention. “I minimize
anything that would be a question or a distraction,” he said
“particularly in the packed bags. I don’t put anything in them that
would be so radiopaque, or difficult to X-Ray, that they can’t tell
obviously what it is. So, for example, with a camera, I don’t leave
it in the bag anymore. I will have it on top of my suit coat and
shoes, so that it’s easily visualized and seen. I also ensure that as
it’s sitting on the belt, that it goes through in such a way as to be
easier to appreciate what it is . . . . Number two is that I don’t even
speak to them. I don’t engage them. They ask a question, I give a
short answer. They don’t ask a question, I don’t say anything.”
This allows him to avoid having any “personal interactions with
any of the folks who are working as security screeners.”
Resistance
Two “quite polite employees” stopped Kostas (25M, Greek)
just before he went into the security checkpoint. They “made
me drink the entire bottle of cola before proceeding,” he said.
“Technically, I didn’t have to drink it, just throw it away, but I
did enjoy their awkwardness when watching me drink slowly.”
Nora, who finds frisking and body scans adverse, also
commented on screener interaction. “I try to make it more
personal,” she said. “Like, if the questions are being rattled off,
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I may like, hesitate, and then like, actually make eye contact with
the person before I respond to the question, just to kind of, like,
break the routine, so to speak, to kind of recognize, like pause
and be like hey, like, ‘it’s not just– it’s not just dealing with goods,
passing through, or these toxic goods or these non-toxic goods,’
but that it’s an actual person, interpersonal interaction, albeit
perfect strangers.” Nora wants to be treated like a human being,
not a commodity, so she subtly changes the communication
dynamic between herself and screeners.
Both of these examples can be seen as instances of resistance.
They involve attempts to regain a degree of agency and to acquire
some control in the screening process. To some extent they
may be seen as successful: Kostas makes the security personnel
wait for him and Nora makes them acknowledge her human
presence. At the same time they are very constrained and partial
victories. Kostas might drink his soda slowly but he is still forced
to consume his drink rather than take it with him. Nora might
make eye contact, but is still subject to processing she finds
objectionable. Ultimately, these travelers can only change how
they comply with security demands, not whether they comply.
The reason is obvious. If resistance goes too far, the security
staff has the ability to forbid air travel, or even worse. As Andrea
(29F, Chilean) said, “you can get really anxious. Not because of
they treating you bad, because you feel that you can eventually
get in a unpleasant situation.”
Even watching resistance evokes anxiety because of
the potential consequences. Louise (28F, Irish) observed a
disagreement between a traveler and screening staff in a British
airport. She “noticed a young man questioning his bag being
searched – two members of airport security were with him, one
seemed to be the other’s supervisor. I wished the young traveler
would stop questioning as it was making the staff very defensive.”
Here, the staff ’s defensiveness is the patina on the surface of an
embedded risk: travelers may be sorted out of the ‘safe us’ and
into a ‘dangerous other’ at the discretion of surveillers.
DISCUSSION
The analysis addressed three questions:
(1) What are the forms of recognition and misrecognition that
people experience at airports?
(2) How are these experienced?
(3) How do people react?
The Surveillance Experiences and the (Mis)recognized Self
section summarizes and contextualizes the answers to these
questions. Then, as promised the Autonomy, the Variable Self, and
Context section uses these findings to explore the implications of
the (mis)recognized self for autonomy.
Surveillance Experiences and the
(Mis)recognized Self
On Recognition
The analysis explored two forms of recognition (explicit and
implicit) that occurred at airports as a result of security screening.
It demonstrated explicit recognition with an incident where
airport screeners claimed shared group membership with a
military officer, and the officer in turn accepted this claim. Here,
the screeners affirmed a valued social identity. This recognition
was mutual; the military officer in turn saw the screeners as
uniformed government employees, along with himself. Within
this case, screeners referenced a safe ingroup (see Figure 1), to
which they included military members generally, and George
specifically, through their actions. This illustrates some of the
characteristics these screeners used to determine their own group
boundaries, which they then subsequently recognized in George.
In implicit recognition, airport surveillance itself served as
a recognition vector. This occurred when travelers projected a
relatable category onto an aspect of the surveillance process;
here, the example was ‘people who have had to do work they
don’t enjoy.’ Another form of implicit recognition occurred
when travelers felt included within a ‘common us,’ which was
understood as an airport-security protected safe ingroup. In this
case, travelers projected their own sense that airport security
exists to protect ‘people like them’ onto airport screening, and
felt recognized as a result. The process of airport security
physically separates people, processes them, and then recognition
psychologically reintegrates them into the ‘safe us.’
Whichever its form, recognition improves security screening
experiences. This can be a matter of making experiences that
might ordinarily be invasive and unpleasant, such as intimate
body searches, less negative. In other cases it transforms screening
into an experience that is memorable for its extreme positivity.
Because of this improved experience, recognition does not put
travelers off the screening process. It does not lead them to change
their behavior in order to change their experience. If anything
the contrary is true. Recognition led travelers not only to accept
screening, but also to be open to more. Recall, for instance,
George’s remark that recognition made his day. In that moment,
if screeners had asked, he would have been okay with turning his
socks inside out.
This response to recognition looks like engaged followership,
a type of identification that occurs when people identify with
leaders and the community they represent (Reicher et al., 2012).
Here, instead of working toward a leader’s explicit goals, the
traveler participates, along with screeners and the surveillance
apparatus, toward the ingroup community’s socioculturally
bounded goals: safety for the ‘common us.’ This is engaged
participation, as it were, rather than submission to authority or
grudging acquiescence. Therefore, it should be no surprise that
travelers are amenable to accepting airport security when they
experience recognition during screening. In fact, this finding is
akin to closed circuit television (CCTV) studies that found shared
identity results in more surveillance acceptance (O’Donnell et al.,
2010a,b), and a study of online surveillance that indicated
participants objected when they felt surveillance misrepresented
them (Stuart and Levine, 2017).
This is not to say recognition gives carte blanche for
surveillance. One can feel fully recognized as a member of a
‘safe’ ingroup, but simultaneously express qualified acceptance
when recognition on one self-definition occurs at the same time
as misrecognition on another self-definition. Recall how Apple
endorsed airport surveillance as something that exists for ‘our
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safety,’ but also expressed regret and wished for a less rigid and
cautious society. The present study’s findings, in conjunction
with research that showed qualified support for CCTV in public
space (Dixon et al., 2003), suggests this reaction may be a more
a response to being categorized and scrutinized, rather than
related to the specific surveillance modality, like airport security
or CCTV. Taken together, this suggests that friction between
self-definitions is implicated in qualified support for surveillance;
future studies can test this hypothesis.
Finally, this study shows recognition has the power to move
people from one category to another, a phenomena which
the psychology literature has termed ‘recategorization.’ What
this means, in plain terms, is category transition. Recall that
George doesn’t always have good experiences with screeners.
Sometimes, he positions them as outgroup members due to
being unimpressed with the TSA’s “level of professionalism
[and] appropriateness.” In the present study, George reframed
this group (TSA officers) after they showed him they were
‘recognizable’ as members of a common ingroup. A similar
finding has been demonstrated in experiments (Simon et al.,
2015). The present study takes this one step further by showing
implicit recognition is implicated in self-definition transition.
Future studies can explore the circumstances under which this
is (or is not) the case.
On Misrecognition
When it comes to misrecognition, things are very different.
Misrecognition by commission occurred when hetero self-
definitions (that is, imposed self-definitions) were dissonant with
auto self-definitions. Threat misrecognition, a specific subtype
of misrecognition by commission, occurred when travelers
who identified as unthreatening members of the surveillance-
protected ingroup instead felt airport security treated them as
personally dangerous.
Threat misrecognition can come from a sense that screening
procedures are flawed, and thus unable to determine who is ‘safe’
and who is ‘dangerous.’ Once confidence in reincorporation into
the ‘safe us’ is lost, then the mere fact of being scrutinized becomes
contested. Surveillance is pointless and intrusive when it is not for
‘our’ safety.
Misrecognition by omission, on the other hand, refers to
instances where valued identities are denied or misperceived.
In the case of devalued national/racial categories and
dehumanization, either one’s identity as a human being,
with attendant rights and dignity, is violated, or else a specific
group membership (in Vik’s case, as Indian) is treated negatively.
The separation here is analytic rather than substantive. Often
the two are intertwined: Vik is treated as trash because he is
viewed as Indian.
With regard to experience, misrecognition is the opposite
of recognition. It is experienced negatively: a combination of
unwelcome confusion (‘why am I picked on, what did I do’),
distress, and anger. In recognition, ingroup members open bags.
In misrecognition, strangers invade them. What is acceptable in
one context becomes intrusive in another. In recognition, acts
that would be otherwise invasive can be experienced as mildly
discomforting, or even actively endorsed. The opposite is the case
with misrecognition: what might be minor intrusion in another
circumstance is strongly discomforting.
Such is the negativity of misrecognition experiences that
the sampled travelers changed their behavior, going to
considerable lengths to try and ensure these experiences
don’t reoccur. Travelers try to avoid sites where they experienced
misrecognition, because they anticipate it happening again, even
to the extent of eschewing air travel entirely. If they continue
to travel through potential misrecognition sites, they take great
care not to do things that might invoke scrutiny. Or, they try to
reassert a measure of agency and dignity, but are limited by the
knowledge that if they confront authorities directly, they will be
the ones to lose.
So, resistance is risky, and thus limited; however, this does
not mean these travelers accepted imposed self-definitions. The
people in this sample are very clear about who they are. They
are apt to question the system after misrecognition rather than
question themselves. As Nora reported, misrecognition inspired
confidence in her own self-definitions. But, this may not always
be the case. For instance, this study showed imposed categories
stimulated avoidance, accommodation, and resistance. None
of these involved category acceptance, though this has been
demonstrated in other studies (Moss and Vollhardt, 2016).
Clearly, some people do adopt imposed categories, though as yet
this topic remains under-researched.
Finally, in the present study, participants experienced
recognition as a positive affirmation. But what happens when
people accept recognized self-definitions, but don’t want to be
read on that dimension in a given temporospatial context?
Recognition functions as misrecognition when it coincides with
a desire to be read on a different self-definition (McNamara,
2019). A clear example can be seen in the case of military
members and veterans. George was quite happy to be thanked
for his service during screening; in his case, he experienced
something like the collective effervescence (e.g., Olaveson, 2001)
reported during positively experienced crowd events (Hopkins
et al., 2016). But there is reason to believe recognition is
not uniformly positive or desirable. It can be unwanted and
experienced negatively; in which case, it is no longer truly
recognition (McNamara, 2019).
Strengths, Limitations, and Pushing Toward Future
Research
First, while some research suggests that interviews and diaries
result in different types of information that might not be
comparable in one analysis (Bornat and Bytheway, 2012),
this is not the case in the present study. The difference
is likely due to the fact Bornat and Bytheway (2012) were
interested in life histories. Their observations suggest it may
be problematic to uncritically combine long-term reflection
and reflection on everyday life. The present paper’s analytical
focus, however, falls into the realm of ‘everyday life,’ with some
longitudinal overlap in terms of how people contextualized their
own experiences.
While some participants did contextualize their experience
temporally, these types of reflections were present, unprompted,
in both the retrospective interviews and diaries completed soon
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after travel.9 Therefore, unlike Bornat and Bytheway (2012), the
present study’s interviews and diaries resulted in analytically
comparable data, so there was no logical problem with
approaching these samples as one dataset. And, in fact, the
combined dataset was a strength of this study, as the first author
avoided over-sampling memorable outliers (a limitation of
retrospective interviews) and effectively sought non-conforming
cases (a limitation of pre-travel recruitment diaries).
Second, readers might ask whether there were differences
between responses in the diaries and interviews that impacted
the analysis. There were no analytically relevant differences in
richness between datasets (when richness is defined as details
necessary for conducting the analysis) except in the case of two
diary respondents who did not answer the reflection question
(e.g., how did you feel about this). As explained in the methods
section, these were excluded as data because those respondents
opted out of future contact.
It is, however, worth mentioning that some participants
had a first language other than English, and the first author
asked all questions in English. If this paper reported a study
specifically on emotional complexity (e.g., Grossmann et al.,
2016), or a study on culturally bounded phenomena (e.g.,
Nogueira et al., 2015), rather than an exploratory study on
recognition/misrecognition during airport screening, then this
approach might be a flaw. But those were not the questions
answered in this paper, and all participants (sans the excluded
two) responded with a level of detail sufficient for the
analysis. Future studies can investigate culture, emotion and
recognition/misrecognition specifically and use questions in local
languages where appropriate.
Third, when the first author was preparing this manuscript,
a colleague asked her whether she thought all of the requested
demographic categories were relevant to the surveillance
experience analysis. Simply put, not necessarily. This paper’s
analysis was oriented around the categories participants raised
in their screening accounts. So the demographic categories
should be understood as relevant to describing the sample as
a whole, not necessarily as relevant to the individual accounts.
The demographic categories were chosen in order to describe
an international, mixed student/non-student sample to readers
with enough information so as paint a picture, but not so much
that the categories risked priming participants or asking them
unnecessarily intimate questions.
For instance, participants weren’t asked to report past sexual
trauma, which can make pat-downs difficult (e.g., Dailey, 2010).
There is, after all, no reason to assume that when a category is
relevant to experience in the past, it will always be relevant in the
future. This is in line with the philosophical basis of this study: an
intent to be open to unknown unknowns, such as the relevance
of ‘threat misrecognition’ or ‘recognition as a member of a
9Interview example: “When I think of my experiences I kind of think of the
different changes of how I viewed security, as a very young traveler, and now as
a more mature traveler (Nora, 25F, American).”
Diary example: “Although I am used to the procedure, due to frequent travel,
it is still baﬄing that this amount of security measures is used, even in non-
international flights; it seems a bit paranoid, given the relative absense of
highjacking since 2001 (Daniel, 25F, German/Cuban).”
common ingroup’ to how otherwise privileged groups experience
surveillance. Seeing these concepts situated in rich, contextual
data made their relevance clear. This approach was also integral
to discovering and theorizing implicit recognition.
Fourth, while these data were drawn from a mixed
student/non-student sample (a particular strength of this study),
the sample skewed toward highly educated white Americans and
Western Europeans. This reflects the university populations the
first author had access to during data collection, and it also
reflects the fact that the accessible people who had time to be
gatekeepers were themselves privileged with enough free time
(time wealth; Chatzitheochari and Arber, 2012) to hand out and
collect diaries, or do the groundwork to find interviewees. Future
research on recognition/misrecognition should intentionally seek
wider representation.
Fifth, even though the study was designed around an open
perspective, intended to maximize the space participants had to
discuss their own concerns rather than the presumed concerns
generated by researchers, these participants may have instead
only raised topics that they assumed were of interest to the first
author. Therefore, this study should not be read as an exhaustive
account of all of the possible types of recognition/misrecognition.
To conclude this section, future research should also
investigate how recognition/misrecognition is (or is not) relevant
to empirical topics other than surveillance. To start the process of
pushing forward recognition/misrecognition research, the final
portion of the paper presents a problematization of autonomy,
selfhood, and context in light of the recognition/misrecognition
and surveillance analysis.
Autonomy, the Variable Self, and Context
The first section shows that autonomy needs a recognized self.
The second section is a brief analysis of airport surveillance
in terms of whether it is an autonomy supportive or
coercive context.
Autonomy: The Freedom to Define Selfhood and Act
From Self One Chooses
Let’s return once more to how autonomy is generally defined
within the psychological literature. It involves self-rule, self-
regulation, and willingly endorsed action (e.g., Ryan et al., 2015).
By definition, autonomy requires the ability to act freely on the
basis of ones own self.
This means autonomy comprises two freedoms, not just one.
The first is the freedom to determine the self one acts upon.
The second is the freedom to act on that self. This means that
autonomy can be compromised at two levels. Either the subject
can be constrained in terms of self-definition, or they can be
constrained in terms of the ability to act on a chosen self-
definition. This distinction may be obscured if selfhood is viewed
as singular, or if the possibility of multiple selves is alluded to
without attendance to its structure, function or context. However,
the question of ‘choice of self ’ becomes critical if we view selfhood
as multiple and contextually variable. That is precisely what the
variable self gives us, and why recognition and misrecognition
are fundamental to autonomy.
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Under conditions of recognition, even behaviors that might
be seen as imposed (submitting to scrutiny), and therefore fall
outside conventional autonomy definitions, are seen as acts of
volition from the recognized actor’s perspective. Those who
anticipated or experienced recognition wanted to be screened.
They wanted to be screened thoroughly. They would choose
to increase participation, should that choice be offered. For
in complying in this way, their sense of self is affirmed. If
autonomy is to be defined only in terms of volition, then they are
acting autonomously, even within a context of power inequality
and constraint.10
Misrecognition, however, denies people the self they would
choose, and consequently the ability to act on that self. For the
misrecognized, their preoccupation becomes to avoid further
misrecognition, or else to recover their desired self. They avoid
places they would otherwise want to go, and they go through
elaborate procedures that they would not otherwise choose to
undertake. In neither case could this be described as autonomous
action. Resistance, one might think, would be different. Here
people reassert who they are and act on their own autonomous
terms. But this paper demonstrates how limited resistance can be
under conditions of misrecognition.
In sum, none of the range of possibilities open to travelers
under conditions of misrecognition are entirely satisfactory. They
are all strategies to deal with a situation where one cannot
act on the basis of the self one would choose, but none of
them entirely restores that choice of selfhood. But, this is not
all. There is still the issue of whether contexts are autonomy
supportive or coercive.
Is Airport Surveillance Autonomy Supportive or
Coercive?
As Martin (2010) observed, travelers are expected to make
themselves legible to airport security. What this means is that
they, like those in Eggers’ (2013) Silicon Valley surveillance
culture narrative, are expected to be both transparent (totally
open) and readable (totally understandable). They are expected
to expose themselves to scrutiny (see also, Ball, 2009) in order to
be allowed to fly. Analytically, this reads as a coercive context:
either open yourself to surveillance, or don’t fly.
So, one might come to the conclusion that airport surveillance
is incompatible with autonomy. In other words, perhaps the
airport security checkpoint is simply a heteronomous context.
But that would be missing the point. While Nora and Charlotte
were unable to act from their chosen self-definitions and also
expose themselves to airport surveillance’s gaze, others clearly
demonstrated a willingness to expose more. They were engaged
participants in surveillance because they identified with their
surveillance-protected ingroup, and were recognized as members
of this ingroup. As another example, Kostas gleefully resisted,
suggesting misrecognition on one self-definition may, in some
circumstances, open the possibility of autonomy on another
self-definition.
10To be clear: while the findings suggest that autonomy is possible with recognition
during airport surveillance, there is nothing here that suggests that all behaviors
that occur under conditions of recognition are autonomous.
So it is not a matter of whether surveillance is or is not
an autonomy-supportive context in any absolute sense. The
critical point is surveillance experience has a frame of reference;
it is perceived from a position (see also, Haslam and Turner,
1995). And, this frame of reference is not static. It changes.
Even with the same person, surveillance engagement differs.
When George experiences recognition, he reports engagement.
When he experiences misrecognition, he reports disengagement.
So, recognition/misrecognition is implicated in how travelers
perceive airport security, and how they act as a result. A context
that is perceived as autonomy-supportive on one self-definition
may well be heteronomous on another self-definition.
Toward a Future Autonomy Research
Agenda
The autonomy definition used within much of psychology is
limited by its implicit construction of a single, unified self,
whether this self is co-constructed by family and culture (e.g.,
Kag˘itçibas¸i, 1996), is to some degree related (e.g., Ryan and
Deci, 2000b), or separate (Deci and Ryan, 1985). None of these
approaches integrate the way in which the variable self functions
as a result of context, and none take into consideration the
consequences of recognized or misrecognized selfhood for action.
Therefore, this paper puts forward an autonomy framework that
integrates a multiple, context-variable self and a more sensitive
context definition.
But, the analysis is limited in terms of what it can say
about how people experience autonomy. This is because the
study design was not constructed with autonomy in mind. The
autonomy analysis was a post hoc assessment. Future studies
should be constructed around understanding how participants
experience autonomy from their perspective. So, here are some
questions to start a new autonomy research agenda:
1. Is being asked to act from a hetero-self-definition when you
would prefer to act upon an auto-self definition experienced
as autonomy or heteronomy?
2. What are the consequences for autonomy under
circumstances where social practices prohibit people
from acting on the self they prefer?
Since the autonomy literature assumes a single self, questions
like these risk remaining unasked. If we assume selfhood,
we risk misinterpreting the meaning of actions. To put it
in more theoretically cogent terms, under-theorizing selfhood
risks secondary phenomena (thought/action) masking primary
phenomena (recognized/misrecognized selfhood).11 And from
there, whether an action is autonomous or heteronomous
becomes rather muddy.
This is not just a theory problem, however. It is also a practice
problem. Misrecognition structurally limits the ability to act upon
on auto self-definitions (McNamara, 2019; see also, Hopkins
and Blackwood, 2011), which may lead to social withdrawal
(Blackwood et al., 2015; McNamara, 2019). Therefore, we should
11McNamara, M. E. (manuscript in preparation). The Context of Radicalization
and the Variable Self: Exploring Radicalization as an Empirical Topic.
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also explore the consequences of interventions that are designed
without a realistic understanding of selfhood.
CONCLUSION
Self-definitions are fundamental to surveillance experience.
When airport surveillance imposes self-definitions, they
may be consonant or dissonant with how travelers define
themselves. Recognition occurred when screeners affirmed
travelers’ auto-self definitions (explicit recognition) or travelers
projected recognition on the screening process (implicit
recognition). The sampled travelers experienced recognition
positively, except when recognition conflicted with a dissonant
self-definition. They reproduced their behavior, reported
willingness to undergo searches that would be considered
invasive in other circumstances, incorporated themselves
into a common ingroup, and incorporated others into a
common ingroup. While recognized travelers were engaged
security participants, misrecognized travelers withdrew,
accommodated, or enacted limited resistance. Misrecognition
occurred when screening imposed dissonant categories
(misrecognition by commission) and when it devalued or denied
auto self-definitions (misrecognition by omission). This was
negatively experienced.
Finally, this paper theorized autonomy by problematizing
the self and autonomy through the lens of previous analyses.
With recognition, behaviors that might seem to be enforced
by an outside authority are instead experienced as acts of
volition. Misrecognition denied auto self-definitions, so actions
then centered on avoiding misrecognition or asserting self-
definitions. None of these actions, however, restored the choice
of self, nor the ability to act on the self one chooses.
Therefore, autonomy is conceptually limited when it does
not integrate the variable self. What is more, autonomy is
inhibited if people cannot choose the self they wish to act
upon, or are constrained to act on a self they do not choose.
The autonomous self is multiple; contextually variable, and acts
within a supportive context.
In sum, recognition/misrecognition are central to surveillance
experience, selfhood, and autonomy. Autonomy requires the
freedom to choose selfhood, as well as the freedom to enact
selfhood. Autonomy is inhibited if people cannot choose the self
they wish to act upon, or are constrained to act on a self they do
not choose. This has implications for how studies are designed,
how findings are used to build theory, and how theory is used to
design interventions.
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